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THE HIGH COURT WADES INTO STATE-LAW
WATER ALLOCATION
LOGAN STARR†
ABSTRACT
Interstate water disputes have long been a mainstay of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, the traditional forum for sovereign states
to resolve their water wars peaceably. For over a century, these
remained disputes between sovereigns: until 2010, when the Court
permitted a private power company to intervene in such a dispute.
The decision was an affront to state sovereign control of water
resources, but its implications reach beyond dignitary concerns.
Under the public trust doctrine, states have long held a fiduciary
responsibility to allocate water resources within their borders in the
interests of their citizens. As global climate change and the increasing
demands of energy production continue to stress America’s water
resources, the Court’s decision will further complicate states’ efforts to
enact sound water policy for the future.

INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court permitted Duke Energy Carolinas,
LLC, (Duke Energy) to intervene in an interstate water-rights dispute
between North Carolina and South Carolina over the Catawba
1
River. It marked the first time in the Court’s history that a private
party successfully intervened in an action for the equitable
2
apportionment of an interstate waterway. By allowing Duke
Energy’s intervention, the Court effectively relaxed its standard for
citizen intervention in equitable apportionments, giving the power
company unprecedented direct access to the Supreme Court to
represent its private water interests against the sovereign interests of
the party-states.
Copyright © 2013 by Logan Starr.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013; Wesleyan University, B.A. 2006.
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1. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 859 (2010).
2. Id. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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The Catawba River runs from North Carolina’s Blue Ridge
Mountains into South Carolina, where it becomes the Wateree River
and then the Santee River, before flowing into the Atlantic Ocean.
Duke Energy operates eleven hydroelectric dams on the Catawba
3
River. The company also makes significant water withdrawals to cool
its coal-fired, natural-gas, and nuclear plants, providing power to its
4
2.3 million customers in the Carolinas. The rapidly growing
Charlotte, North Carolina metropolitan area has increasingly relied
on interbasin transfers from the Catawba River to fuel its growth,
reducing downstream flows into South Carolina, particularly in times
5
of drought. Drought in the Catawba-Wateree Basin has occurred
with increasing frequency. The national conservation group American
Rivers named the Catawba “America’s Most Endangered River” in
2008 and listed “outdated water supply management” as the primary
6
threat to the Catawba-Wateree Basin’s ecosystems. The Energy Law
Journal named Charlotte as the U.S. metropolitan area most at risk of
water shortages resulting from withdrawals by thermoelectric power
7
plants.
In 2007, South Carolina sued North Carolina under the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction for an apportionment of the Catawba
River, complaining that its upstream neighbor was taking more than
8
its equitable share of the waterway. In particular, South Carolina
challenged the validity of North Carolina’s interbasin transfers to
9
Charlotte and other municipalities. Duke Energy, the City of
10
Charlotte, and the Catawba River Water Supply Project (CRWSP)
11
all moved to intervene as defendants. Justice Alito wrote for the
3. Id. at 866 (majority opinion).
4. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electricity-Water Nexus and the U.S.
Electric Utility Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 26 (2009).
5. See First Interim Report of the Special Master at 3–6, South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854
(Orig. No. 138) (“[South Carolina] alleges that the Catawba River Basin is a densely populated
area that is expected to experience significant population growth over the next decade. It alleges
that the Catawba is subject to severe periodic fluctuations in water level, and that its flow
historically has been affected by prolonged droughts.”).
6. AM. RIVERS, AMERICA’S MOST ENDANGERED RIVERS: 2008 EDITION 13 (2008),
available at http://act.americanrivers.org/MER/PDFs/MER_2008.pdf.
7. Sovacool, supra note 4, at 24. Thermoelectric generation includes coal-fired, naturalgas, and nuclear plants. Id. at 13.
8. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 858.
9. Id. at 859.
10. The CRWSP is a bistate entity that provides water to Lancaster County, South
Carolina and Union County, North Carolina. Id. at 860.
11. Id.
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majority of a closely divided Court, which granted intervention to
12
Duke Energy and the CRWSP but denied Charlotte’s motion. Chief
Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in
part, expressing that all three parties’ motions should have been
denied to preserve the sovereign nature of equitable-apportionment
13
actions.
States have historically played a primary role in the allocation of
water resources within their borders, based on both the state
14
sovereign ownership doctrine and the public trust doctrine. Over the
past hundred years, the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of
equitable apportionment to allow for the peaceful resolution of
interstate water-rights conflicts, which have been some of the most
15
divisive squabbles between the states. Traditionally, these original
actions have been exclusively disputes between sovereign entities: the
16
states, the federal government, and Native American tribes. For
these reasons, Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent that state
sovereignty, a key factor in the Court’s equitable-apportionment
precedents, barred private-party intervention in equitable17
apportionment actions. But the Chief Justice’s opinion tells only part
of the story. The unique nature of water resources in the United
States indicates that equitable apportionments are unlike other
original actions. Beyond the equitable-apportionment precedents on
which he relied, both traditional water federalism—as expressed
through state public trust doctrines—and the specter of water scarcity
build an even stronger argument against Duke Energy’s intervention.
Because the earth has a finite supply of freshwater, water policy
is fundamentally about tradeoffs between competing uses. The
energy-water nexus is a principle recognizing the interdependence of
energy production and water supply in the face of water scarcity.
Water is critical to energy-resource extraction and energy generation,
whether it be oil refining, hydroelectric generation, power-plant

12. Id. at 858–59. Justice Alito was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part was
joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Id. at 858.
13. Id. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 5, at 24–25.
17. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
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cooling, or emissions scrubbing. Traditional fuel sources of
thermoelectric generation such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear
power—which account for 87 percent of electricity production in the
19
United States —require significant quantities of water for the cooling
process. For instance, a five hundred megawatt coal-fired power plant
20
uses more than twelve million gallons in a single hour. Water
purification, distribution, and treatment are similarly reliant on
21
energy production. Electricity accounts for 75 percent of the cost of
municipal water treatment and supply, and roughly 4 percent of the
22
nation’s electricity goes to processing water. End use of water,
particularly activities such as water heating and laundry, also has
23
significant energy costs. As a result, the energy-water nexus instructs
that energy policy and water policy should be developed jointly, in
24
recognition of this interrelationship.
Smart energy-water policy requires an understanding of how
much water competing modes of electricity generation use. It is
necessary to distinguish between consumption, in which water is
18. Ann E. Drobot, Transitioning to a Sustainable Energy Economy: The Call for National
Cooperative Watershed Planning, 41 ENVTL. L. 707, 715 (2011).
19. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR
DECEMBER 2012: FEBRUARY 2013, at 23 tbl.1.1 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/
electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf.
20. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., ESTIMATING FRESHWATER NEEDS TO MEET FUTURE
THERMOELECTRIC GENERATING REQUIREMENTS 8 (2010), available at http://www.netl.doe
.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/2010_Water_Needs_Analysis.pdf.
21. Drobot, supra note 18, at 728; Michael E. Webber, Catch-22: Water vs. Energy, SCI.
AM., Sept. 2008, at 36–39.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY DEMANDS ON WATER RESOURCES: REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCY OF ENERGY AND WATER 25 (2006), available at http://
www.sandia.gov/energy-water/docs/121-RptToCongress-EWwEIAcomments-FINAL.pdf#63.
23. See id. at 26 (“Activities such as water heating, clothes washing, and clothes drying
require 14 percent of California’s electricity consumption and 31 percent of its natural gas
consumption. Most of that use is in the residential sector.”).
24. In a report to Congress, the Department of Energy advised that meeting the nation’s
“energy and water needs [will require] properly valuing each resource, rather than following the
current U.S. path of largely managing water and energy separately while making small
improvements in freshwater supply and small changes in energy and water-use efficiency.” U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 22, at 11; see also Hydropower: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Energy & Natural Res., 112th Cong. 4–5 (2011) (statement of Steven G. Chalk, Chief Operating
Officer and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Renewable Energy, Department of Energy)
(“We recommend that any studies on [energy] consider potential increases in water demand
that will result from projected growth of energy production, and that interagency collaboration
and consultation be part of these studies, as adequate water availability is an issue for every
sector of the economy.”); Webber, supra note 21, at 36 (“We cannot build more power plants
without realizing that they impinge on our freshwater supplies. And we cannot build more water
delivery and cleaning facilities without driving up energy demand.”).
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removed from the source, and withdrawal, in which water is used and
returned to its source. The U.S. Geological Survey does not consider
the 3,160 billion gallons of water that flow daily through hydroelectric
turbines to be withdrawn—or consumed—because the water remains
25
in the river and may even be used by successive dams. But
hydropower also involves significant water consumption via
26
evaporation from large storage reservoirs. It additionally creates
significant water-quality impacts on aquatic ecology, such as changes
in temperature, dissolved-nitrogen and dissolved-oxygen levels, and
27
natural flow characteristics. Further, hydroelectric generation
“varies greatly with the amount of water available, depending upon
weather patterns and local hydrology, as well as on competing water
uses, such as flood control, water supply, recreation, and in-stream
28
flow needs (for example, navigation and the aquatic environment).”
Therefore, although most water used for hydropower may technically
remain in-stream, allocating water to hydropower involves tradeoffs
29
with other uses and substantial impacts on riparian ecosystems. As
Part IV discusses, courts are poorly equipped to value natural
resources and make these tradeoffs between competing uses.
The effects of global climate change will continue to aggravate
30
water-supply problems and demand that water and energy policy
incorporate an understanding of the energy-water nexus. The
Department of Energy reports that “[l]ong-term cyclical changes in
precipitation patterns and the effect on flows in rivers and the
operation of reservoirs and hydroelectric plants are a major concern

25. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 22, at 20.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 23.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Cf. Katherine A. Abend, Avoiding Water-Intensive Energy Production: How To Keep
the Water Running and the Lights On, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,020, 11,024 (2011) (“There are
always opportunity costs when a community allocates water to support a power plant, instead of
assigning it to public supply, agricultural, recreational, or environmental uses. The economic
losses that droughts impose on various economic sectors and the environment demonstrate that
those sectors would benefit greatly if less water were needed for thermoelectric facilities,
especially in times of water scarcity.”).
30. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 7 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (“[N]umerous
long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in arctic temperatures
and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects
of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of
tropical cyclones.”).
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to the energy industry.” The problem is worsened by the fact that in
the United States, the population is growing most rapidly in areas that
are already water stressed, such as the Las Vegas, Phoenix, Atlanta,
32
and Charlotte metropolitan areas. Professor Ann Drobot warns that
“[p]redicted impacts from climate change along with increased
demands on both the energy and the water sectors fueled by
projected population growth threaten to exacerbate already stressed
water resources, raising the specter of resource supply disruptions in
33
both sectors and escalating concerns over national security.” As a
result, now more than ever, good water policy will need to
incorporate good energy policy, and good energy policy will need to
incorporate good water policy.
This Note expands and reframes Chief Justice Roberts’s
reasoning in South Carolina. It argues that, in addition to the
Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment precedents, state-law
public trust doctrines should have persuaded the Court to deny
citizen intervention in South Carolina. This Note also considers the
policy implications of the Court’s challenge to state sovereignty over
water resources, in light of the energy-water nexus and global climate
change. Except in extreme circumstances, denying citizen
intervention is normatively a better result given water scarcity and the
communal nature of water resources across the United States, as
reflected in state public trust doctrines. As equitable-apportionment
actions—and interstate water disputes generally—occur with
increasing frequency, the Court’s disruption of the balance between
public and private water interests may significantly undermine both
state and federal efforts toward more effective water-resource
management. The Supreme Court has an important role to play as a
forum of last resort for interstate water-rights disputes between
sovereign states, but the intrastate allocation of water between

31. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 22, at 32. Other parts of the country may also face
the cumulative effects of water shortages and increased demand for water. The U.S. Geological
Survey predicts that in areas where reservoirs depend on snowmelt, climate change will lead to
“reduced water availability during the season of peak water demand. This reduction in
availability would result from a combination of increased evaporation and transpiration from
warmer temperatures and a lengthening of the warm season, as well as increased irrigation
demand.” HARRY F. LINS, ROBERT M. HIRSCH & JULIE KIANG, WATER—THE NATION’S
FUNDAMENTAL CLIMATE ISSUE: A WHITE PAPER ON THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY ROLE
AND CAPABILITIES 4 (2010), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1347/pdf/circ-1347.pdf.
32. ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 8–9, 23–26, 38–40, 83–84 (2009); NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 20, at 9–10.
33. Drobot, supra note 18, at 731.
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competing uses and users should be determined by elected
legislatures and expert agencies, not the nation’s high court.
This analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the legal
bases for state sovereign ownership of water resources and the
common-law development of state public trust doctrines. Part II
examines
the
Supreme
Court’s
equitable-apportionment
jurisprudence, particularly the factors the Court considers when
evaluating competing claims and the high standards the Court has
imposed on citizen intervenors. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s
decision to permit citizen intervention in South Carolina and argues
that the public trust doctrine and the Court’s own equitableapportionment precedents should have prevented that outcome.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the Supreme Court’s role in adjudicating
water rights in light of the energy-water nexus and global climate
change.
I. STATE SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP OF WATER RESOURCES
A. Traditional Water Federalism
Generally speaking, the law of water allocation in the United
States is state law, based on both the state sovereign ownership
doctrine and the public trust doctrine. These doctrines are closely
34
associated, and both were inherited from the English common law,
in which the monarch held title to certain natural resources for the
35
common benefit. Under the state sovereign ownership doctrine, the
state governments assumed the role of the sovereign when they
36
declared independence from the crown, giving them title to
34. The state sovereign ownership doctrine recognizes that upon achieving statehood, “one
consequence is immediate state ownership of certain lands and waters previously owned by the
British Crown or the federal government.” 2 ROBERT E. BECK, WATERS & WATER
RIGHTS § 30.02(a) (Amy L. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2011). The state holds these lands and waters “in
a fiduciary capacity, for the benefit of members of the general public, and indeed, the ‘public
trust doctrine’ could be regarded as simply the law on the fiduciary aspect of state sovereign
ownership.” Id. This Note uses the term “sovereign ownership doctrine” to refer to the principle
of state control of water resources and “public trust doctrine” to refer to a state’s
responsibilities to its people as a result of sovereign ownership.
35. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) (“The dominion and
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, [are] held by the king as a public
trust . . . for the common benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant, still
remains in the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community.”).
36. See id. at 410 (“[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters
and the soils under them for their own common use . . . .”). New states inherited the same
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sovereign lands and waters. The public trust doctrine is best
understood as “the fiduciary obligation of the state to hold state
38
sovereign resources for the benefit of the general public.” Under the
state sovereign ownership and public trust doctrines, control of water
39
resources creates horizontal federalism in water rights. Thus, states
have adopted various schemes for water-rights management and have
40
adapted these schemes to changing water needs.
Water rights across the United States are usufructuary: a private
party may have an entitlement to use water but not to own it.
Contemporary water law reflects a longstanding tradition of
communal rights in water inherited from the English common law.
Blackstone wrote that water was incapable of purely private
ownership, “[f]or water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of
necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only
41
have a temporary, transient, usufructuary property therein.” Justice
Holmes similarly noted, “[F]ew public interests are more obvious,
indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of
the public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it
42
substantially undiminished.” Holmes further emphasized, “This
public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows
43
more pressing as population grows.” The essentially public nature of
water resources has been more aggressively asserted in the western
United States, where numerous state constitutions and codes
44
pronounce that water is public property. But eastern states have also

sovereign rights over water as the original states through the equal-footing doctrine. Pollard’s
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845).
37. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894) (“[T]he title and rights of riparian or
littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark of navigable waters are governed by the
local laws of the several States, subject, of course, to the rights granted to the United States by
the Constitution.”).
38. 2 BECK, supra note 34, § 30.02(c); see also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 77 (1821)
(describing navigable waters under the public trust as “common to all the citizens . . . subject
only to the laws which regulate that use; that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in
the sovereign, but it is vested in him not for his own use, but for the use of the citizen”).
39. Cf. 2 BECK, supra note 34, § 30.02(b) (discussing the public trust doctrine’s
development as a matter of state law).
40. JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 12–14 (4th ed. 2006).
41. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18.
42. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
43. Id.
44. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 11.021(a) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.010 (West 2004).
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45

understood water rights to be usufructuary. Thus, the inherently
communal nature of water rights in the United States complements
the public trust doctrine in establishing the public values implicated
by water-resource management.
Although states continue to play the primary role in allocating
consumptive water rights, many water resources are under complete
or partial federal control, creating vertical federalism that coexists
with horizontal federalism in water rights. For example, the federal
government’s broad authority over navigable waters is well
46
established under the Commerce Clause. Under the navigation
47
power, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
regulates all hydropower projects, and the federal government itself
48
owns and operates many hydropower facilities. Since the 1970s, the
federal government has assumed new water-management roles under
49
50
the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act.
The public values implicated by water are well established in the
United States based on the state sovereign ownership doctrine, the
public trust doctrine, and the usufructuary nature of water rights.
Though federal involvement in water rights has increased in the
twentieth century, the states continue to bear the responsibility of
managing water resources on behalf of the public interest when
Congress has not acted to assert a federal interest.

45. See 1 BECK, supra note 34, § 6.02(f) (discussing how eastern states, over time, have
broadened the definition of what constitutes public water); see also United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) (“[T]hat the running water in a great navigable
stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.”).
46. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (“In truth
the authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters. Navigability, in
the sense just stated, is but a part of this whole. Flood protection, watershed development,
recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of
commerce control.”).
47. See id. at 404 (“[T]he power to regulate commerce necessarily include[s] power over
navigation.”).
48. 2 BECK, supra note 34, § 40.01.
49. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
50. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 40, at
639–73.
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B. The Evolving Public Trust and Its Application to Consumptive
Water Rights
Although public trust protections were initially applied only to
navigable waters and fisheries, the doctrine evolved and expanded in
the United States through federal and state common law.
1. Illinois Central Introduces Affirmative Public Trust Duties. In
the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court recognized that the
public trust doctrine imposed affirmative duties on states to protect
trust resources in the landmark case Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
51
Illinois. This case held that land submerged under navigable waters
was inalienable and the public trust “require[d] the government of the
52
State to preserve such waters for the use of the public.” The Court
characterized the doctrine as “founded upon the necessity of
preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from private
53
interruption and encroachment.” Illinois Central departed from the
dominant understanding of the doctrine in the nineteenth century as
involving “negative rights, preventing harm but imposing no
54
affirmative duties on the landowner or state.” Although some
scholars have questioned both the facts and legal foundation of
55
Illinois Central, it has enjoyed remarkable influence over naturalresource policy.
2. The Ecological Public Trust Doctrine. In 1970, Professor
Joseph Sax characterized the public trust as an adaptable judicial
doctrine that states could employ to protect a wide range of natural
56
resources beyond navigable waters and tidal lands. According to
51. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
52. Id. at 452–53.
53. Id. at 436.
54. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as
the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 70 (2005).
55. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 924 (2004) (noting
that Justice Field’s opinion was concerned with the anticompetitive practices of a corrupt
railroad, not environmental preservation).
56. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Professor Sax, one of the most prominent voices in
water law, is widely credited with reviving and reinventing the public trust doctrine. E.g., Carol
M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351–52 (1998). His
seminal 1970 article is amongst the fifty all-time-most-cited law-review articles. Fred R. Shapiro
& Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1490 (2012).
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Professor Sax, “[p]ublic trust problems . . . occur in a wide range of
situations in which diffuse public interests need protection against
57
tightly organized groups with clear and immediate goals.” Professor
Sax proposes that the “mixture of procedural and substantive
protections which the courts have applied in conventional public trust
cases” could be applied to “controversies involving air pollution, the
dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities,
and strip mining or wetland filling on private lands in a state where
58
governmental permits are required.” Under Professor Sax’s account,
the public trust doctrine is simultaneously a flexible common law
approach to natural-resource management and a sort of “people’s
59
environmental right.” In particular, Professor Sax advocates that the
public trust doctrine should play a major role in the future of water
60
allocation and conservation. Professor Sax’s public trust doctrine
assumes that state legislatures and agencies will invariably overstep
their authority with respect to trust resources—perhaps, as a result of
legislative or agency capture—and that courts must be given the tools
to ensure good management practices. Professor Sax’s articulation of
the public trust is as much a judicial doctrine as it is another argument
in the environmental advocate’s toolkit, geared toward persuading
judges that they have the authority to rein in careless legislatures. But
Professor Sax’s public trust doctrine also raises legitimate concerns
about judges overruling elected legislatures.
Some scholars have criticized Professor Sax’s expanded public
trust doctrine because they see it as a threat to private property
rights. For instance, Professor Richard Lazarus criticizes the
expanded public trust doctrine as both ineffective and superfluous in
the modern regulatory state, noting that “substantive embrace of
legitimate governmental police power goals is no longer narrow;
indeed, it is broader and more flexible than the embrace of the trust
doctrine both in terms of permissible ends and the natural resources

57. Sax, supra note 56, at 556–57.
58. Id.
59. See Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the
People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980).
60. See Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 474
(1989) (“[P]ublic values have changed, and the use of water has reached some critical limits.
One result is that we need to retrieve some water from traditional water users to sustain streams
and lakes as natural systems and to protect water quality.”).
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to which it applies.” In contrast, Professor Barton Thompson
articulates a conservative defense of the public trust, suggesting that
“[t]he public trust doctrine, in summary, does not challenge the value
and importance of development or private ownership of trust
resources, nor does it bar development or privatization. Instead, the
public trust doctrine speaks only against taking development or
62
privatization to an excess.”
Under Professor Thompson’s
articulation, the public trust doctrine is not a judicial hammer that
guides policy or overrules legislatures but is rather a means of
recognizing and articulating “the value of common ownership and
common management of trust assets” within a private-property
63
system, at the state-government level. Professor Thompson’s
narrower view of the public trust better reflects the doctrine’s role in
most states in which the state government is the people’s trustee of
water resources.
3. State Formulations of the Public Trust Doctrine. Professor
Robin Kundis Craig suggests “that focusing too intently on the classic
public trust doctrine and its origins vitiates the real import . . . [which
is] the individualized state expansions of the classic public trust
64
doctrine.” All fifty states have adopted some form of the public trust
65
doctrine through common law, state constitutions, or statutes.
Although in most states the public trust doctrine did not become the
66
all-purpose judicial tool Professor Sax envisioned, it retains
61. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 674 (1986).
62. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction &
Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 61 (2006).
63. Id. at 68.
64. Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010). Professor Craig further
argues that as climate change redistributes water resources, making wet states drier and dry
states wetter, “within water law, state public trust doctrines can be particularly well-suited to
providing legal support for adaptive management-based climate change adaptation regimes,” id.
at 781, a view that more closely follows Sax.
65. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010).
66. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 228 (2006) (“With some
notable exceptions, state courts appear to have acted as Lazarus predicted, not as Sax hoped.
Few cases have actually forced states to alter their resource management plans.”).

STARR IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTERVENTION IN WATER DISPUTES

3/17/2013 3:55 PM

1437

importance as a comprehensive basis for articulating a state’s right to
protect and manage the public’s interest in scarce natural resources
like freshwater, however the state chooses to define the scope of such
protections.
Several states have explicitly expanded the public trust doctrine
to implicate consumptive water rights. For example, California
extended public trust protections to tributaries as well as navigable
67
waters. Its Supreme Court required Los Angeles County to reduce
its water intake from Mono Lake to protect wildlife, holding that
“[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to
68
protect public trust uses whenever feasible.” Hawaii extended the
scope of its public trust doctrine to protect groundwater and created a
presumption in favor of protecting all natural resources for the public
69
benefit. Several other states have since designated drinking water as
70
a public trust resource or have articulated a right to clean water. But
not every state has followed California’s example. Maine, for
instance, has limited its public trust doctrine to the traditional
71
concerns of navigation, fishing, and fowling. Similarly, Arizona
72
elected not to apply the public trust to groundwater.
These variations in the fifty state public trust doctrines create
some concern for the incorporation of the public trust doctrine into

67. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal.
1983) (“[T]he public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion
of nonnavigable tributaries.”).
68. Id. at 728.
69. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447–54 (Haw. 2000).
70. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-221-702 (2011) (“Recognizing that the waters of the
state are the property of the state and are held in public trust for the benefit of its citizens, it is
declared that the people of the state are beneficiaries of this trust and have a right to both an
adequate quantity and quality of drinking water.”); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska
1998) (“The public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use . . . .”); Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic
Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (“[I]t is clear that
since water is essential for human life, the public trust doctrine applies with equal impact upon
the control of our drinking water reserves.”); Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (“The Constitution of Texas designates rivers and streams as natural
resources, declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature with the
preservation and conservation of such resources.” (citation omitted)). At least eighteen states
have developed what Professor Craig describes as “ecological public trust doctrines.” Craig,
supra note 64, at 829–46.
71. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989).
72. Seven Springs Ranch, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Water Res., 753 P.2d 161, 165–66
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
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the Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. For
example, South Carolina boasts relatively strong public trust
protections for natural resources broadly, including drinking water
73
and nonsubmerged lands. In contrast, North Carolina’s public trust
protections are defined more narrowly, “includ[ing], but . . . not
limited to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all
74
recreational activities in the watercourses of the State.” Such
variations suggest concerns that any federal application of the public
trust doctrine would necessarily be over- or underinclusive with
respect to the party-states involved. But based on Illinois Central and
subsequent cases, federal law recognizes a baseline level of state
75
public trust protection for navigable waters. The Court has further
recognized that “it has been long established that the individual
States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in
public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see
76
fit.” Ultimately, the modern public trust doctrine serves to
supplement the state sovereign ownership doctrine in asserting that
states retain the primary role in water-resource management,
representing the interests of their citizens, when Congress has not
acted to assert a federal interest. Despite the variations between
states, the public trust doctrine plays a vital role in equitableapportionment actions, especially when private interests threaten a
state’s sovereign responsibility to manage water resources in the
public interest.
II. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF INTERSTATE WATERS
A. The Court’s Original Jurisdiction as a Forum of Last Resort for
Sovereign Disputes
States have historically had three avenues to resolve water
disputes with other states: (1) interstate compacts subject to
congressional approval, (2) congressional intervention, and (3) an

73. Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 456 S.E.2d 397, 402 (S.C. 1995).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-45.1 (West 2000).
75. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) (“[I]t came to be
recognized as the ‘settled law of this country’ that the lands under navigable freshwater lakes
and rivers were within the public trust given the new States upon their entry into the Union,
subject to the federal navigation easement and the power of Congress to control navigation on
those streams under the Commerce Clause.” (quoting Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338
(1877))).
76. Id. at 475.
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77

original action before the Supreme Court. An interstate compact,
achieved through negotiations between the party-states, is most
desirable because it is the approach most likely to achieve a result
78
that all parties perceive as fair. Congressional apportionment has
been used less than its alternatives, despite calls for greater federal
79
intervention by some commentators. That leaves the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, which has been the forum of last resort
80
for states when a mutual agreement could not be reached, or when
81
one state alleges that another has violated a preexisting agreement.
Equitable apportionment developed as a federal common-law
doctrine to address the interstate water disputes that began to come
before the Court’s original jurisdiction in the early twentieth century.
Before 1900, the Court’s original jurisdiction was reserved for
82
83
interstate boundary disputes. In Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme
Court held that a water-rights dispute fell within its original
84
jurisdiction over actions between two or more states. The Court
85
stressed the sovereign nature of the states’ interest in water, noting
that no other appropriate forum existed for the states to resolve such

77. GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2000).
78. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 410 (1985) (“Negotiation compromise among states is still
the best apportionment vehicle, but in many cases the product of negotiation—interstate
compacts—merely postpones the exercise of original jurisdiction.”); cf. Colorado v. Kansas, 320
U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (suggesting that interstate water disputes “should, if possible, be the
medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power”).
79. See George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the
Twenty-First Century: Is It Time To Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 813–14 (2005)
(“Congress has acted only twice to apportion interstate water resources.”).
80. See, e.g., Caitlin S. Dyckman, Another Case of the Century? Comparing the Legacy and
Potential Implications of Arizona v. California and the South Carolina v. North Carolina
Proceedings, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 189, 226 (2011) (“[Equitable apportionment] is generally
considered a last resort given the associated cost, antagonism, and uncertainty in the resulting
resource allocation, not to mention the Court’s reluctance to take these cases and act as a trial
court.”).
81. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2011) (resolving a dispute
between three states over the interpretation of terms in the Yellowstone River Compact).
82. Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s Management of
Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 198 (1993); Tarlock, supra note
78, at 384.
83. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
84. Id. at 141–43.
85. See id. at 146–47 (“Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal,
we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case
may demand . . . .”).
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86

a dispute. Equitable apportionment was developed for sovereign
disputes in which “[i]f the two States were absolutely independent
87
nations it would be settled by treaty or by force.” Thus, from the
early twentieth century, the Court handled interstate water disputes
out of necessity rather than a perceived need to guide state water
policy.
Procedurally, given that original actions “tax the limited
resources of [the] Court by requiring [it] ‘awkwardly to play the role
88
89
of factfinder,’” the Court relies on an appointed special master. The
master is responsible for taking evidence and preparing a report for
the Court, but the parties may also gather their own evidence and file
90
exceptions to any findings of the special master. Although a special
master is not given the deference typical of appellate review, original
jurisdiction may have “the practical disadvantage of short-circuiting
the judicial process to which the Court is accustomed in its appellate
91
work.” Then-Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for too often
deferring to the special master’s findings, making the Court’s original
92
jurisdiction more attractive to private litigants. In the case of
sovereign disputes between states, in which the Court’s original
jurisdiction is exclusive, forum shopping is not a concern. But for
private litigants, a truncated trial process and direct access to the
Supreme Court may be quite attractive, if the Court permits their
intervention.

86. See id. at 143 (“The States of this Union cannot make war upon each other. They
cannot ‘grant letters of marque and reprisal.’ They cannot make reprisal on each other by
embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations, and make treaties.”).
87. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907).
88. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 863 (2010) (quoting Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971)).
89. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE DISPUTES: THE SUPREME COURT’S
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 43 (2006) (“The special master, appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court
upon the invocation of its original jurisdiction, in recent decades has played important
investigatory and recommendatory roles in assisting the court to settle interstate disputes.”).
90. Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV.
665, 688 (1959).
91. McKusick, supra note 82, at 193.
92. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 765 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It will
obviously be tempting to many interests of a variety of persuasions on the merits of a particular
issue to ‘start at the top,’ so to speak, and have the luxury of litigating only before a Special
Master followed by the appellate-type review which this Court necessarily gives to his findings
and recommendations.”).
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B. The Substantive Law of Equitable Apportionment
The Court has entered an equitable-apportionment decree—
requiring the upstream user to maintain a specified minimum flow so
93
as not to injure the downstream user—only three times. Thus,
although many interstate water-rights disputes have reached the
Supreme Court, they have usually been resolved outside the Court, in
the shadow of its equitable-apportionment jurisprudence.
1. All Relevant Factors. The Court’s equitable-apportionment
doctrine allows for a flexible, fact-specific balancing of “all relevant
94
factors.” The doctrine requires the court “to weigh the harms and
95
benefits to competing States,” through consideration of
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows,
the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the
practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
96
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.

None of the factors are decisive, and in practice they give way to
97
more generalized notions of equity and fairness. These factors take
98
precedence over the water-rights regime of a particular state. State
law will be considered if both states have similar substantive water
99
law, but it will not control the analysis. The Court has likely
deemphasized individual state regimes because an equitableapportionment decree binds the party-states but not the individual
water rights of their citizens. A decree may have a significant impact
on an individual water user. However, because a decree controls the
rights of state citizens in the aggregate, the allocation of water to
100
individual citizens is left to the states themselves.
93. 3 BECK, supra note 34, § 45.07(a); see also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945)
(apportioning the North Platte River); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931)
(apportioning the Delaware River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (apportioning
the Laramie River).
94. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
95. Id. at 186.
96. Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618.
97. E.g., Tarlock, supra note 78, at 382.
98. 3 BECK, supra note 34, § 45.06(b).
99. Id.
100. See Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 623 (“Nor will the [equitable-apportionment] decree
interfere with relationships among Colorado’s water users. The relative rights of the
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2. Efficiency and Conservation Duties. The Court has recognized
that states have an affirmative duty to use water efficiently and to
conserve water resources. In 1982, it reaffirmed, “[C]onservation
within practicable limits is essential in order that needless waste may
be prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured . . . . [The]
doctrine lays on each of these States a duty to exercise her right
reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the common
101
supply.” But this duty is limited to measures that are “financially
102
and physically feasible.” In practice, the Court has not always given
103
this duty much weight. For example, in Montana v. Wyoming, the
Court explicitly affirmed Wyoming’s right to reduce its downstream
flows to Montana that resulted from Wyoming’s adoption of new
“efficient” irrigation technology that, in fact, returned less water to
104
the river.
States’ affirmative duty to conserve water would seem to arise, at
least in part, from the public trust doctrine, although the Court has
never drawn such a connection between Illinois Central and its
equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. Both the public trust
doctrine and equitable apportionment are largely products of federal
common law, and although unnamed, public trust principles are
implicated in the language of the equitable-apportionment
105
conservation duty. In particular, a state’s duty to exercise water
rights “reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve the
106
common supply” evokes the fiduciary responsibilities inherent in
public trust principles. But equitable-apportionment actions implicate
the duty to conserve more broadly, beyond the public trust doctrine.
States must pursue efficient use not only for the benefit of their own

appropriators are subject to Colorado’s control.”); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572, 579
(1940) (describing that an equitable-apportionment decree “was not intended to restrict
Colorado in determining the use of the water of the river, according to Colorado laws and
adjudications, provided the diversions do not exceed the aggregate amount of 39,750 acre feet”).
101. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1982) (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)).
102. Id. at 185 (quoting Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 486).
103. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011).
104. See id. at 1779 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Thanks to improved irrigation techniques,
Wyoming’s farmers and cattlemen appear to consume more of the water they divert from the
Yellowstone River and its tributaries today than they did 60 years ago—that is to say, less of the
diverted water ultimately finds its way back into the Yellowstone.”).
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. Colorado, 459 U.S. at 186 (quoting Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 484).
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citizens but also for the benefit of water users in both upstream and
107
downstream states.
3. A High Burden for Private-Party Intervention. In part because
equitable-apportionment actions do not directly control the water
rights of individual citizens, the Court has historically imposed a high
burden for citizen intervention. The Court articulated the standard
108
for intervention by private citizens in New Jersey v. New York, in
which it considered Philadelphia’s motion to intervene when
109
Pennsylvania had already done so successfully. The Court clarified
the test for intervention, finding that “[a]n intervenor whose state is
already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling
interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all
other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly
110
represented by the state.” In determining that Philadelphia had not
met its burden, the Court stressed concerns about opening its original
jurisdiction to an unlimited number of political subdivisions,
corporations, or persons within a state, such that the Court would be
effectively arrogating the state’s power to allocate water resources
111
amongst its citizens.
The Court’s result in New Jersey was dictated by the parens
patriae doctrine, under which a state is presumed to represent the
interests of all its citizens with respect to matters implicating state
112
sovereignty. The Court noted that the high burden for intervention
was required out of a “necessary recognition of sovereign dignity,” as
“[o]therwise, a state might be judicially impeached on matters of

107. See, e.g., id. (“We conclude that it is entirely appropriate to consider the extent to
which reasonable conservation measures by New Mexico might offset the proposed Colorado
diversion and thereby minimize any injury to New Mexico users. Similarly, it is appropriate to
consider whether Colorado has undertaken reasonable steps to minimize the amount of
diversion that will be required.”).
108. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 370–71.
110. Id. at 373.
111. See id. (“If we undertook to evaluate all the separate interests within Pennsylvania, we
could, in effect, be drawn into an intramural dispute over the distribution of water within the
Commonwealth . . . . Nor is there any assurance that the list of intervenors could be closed with
political subdivisions of the states. Large industrial plants which, like cities, are corporate
creatures of the state may represent interests just as substantial.”).
112. See id. at 372 (“[Parens patriae] is a recognition of the principle that the state, when a
party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, ‘must be deemed to represent all its
citizens.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 173–74 (1930))).
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113

policy by its own subjects.” Thus the New Jersey test limited
equitable-apportionment decrees to interstate allocation rather than
intrastate allocation, largely preserving traditional water federalism
for consumptive water rights. In practice, this test has created a
sufficiently high burden such that prior to South Carolina, the only
nonstate parties who had successfully intervened in equitableapportionment actions were the federal government and Native
114
American tribes.
III. CITIZEN INTERVENTION IN EQUITABLE-APPORTIONMENT
ACTIONS
A. A Relaxed Standard for Citizen Intervention: South Carolina v.
North Carolina
State control of water allocation is firmly grounded in both the
Supreme Court’s equitable-apportionment precedents and public
trust principles. As a result, the Court’s original jurisdiction was
historically a forum of last resort for water quarrels. In South
Carolina, the special master formulated a broad rule and
recommended that all three parties (Duke Energy, the CRWSP, and
115
Charlotte) be granted leave to intervene. South Carolina filed
116
exceptions with respect to each of the three parties.
By permitting Duke Energy and the CRWSP to intervene, but
117
not Charlotte, the Court relaxed its standard for private party
intervention in interstate water disputes. Thus, the Court gave
nonsovereign parties unprecedented access to represent their private
interests against the sovereign interests of the party-states. The
Court’s reinterpretation of the New Jersey test and its inconsistent
application of the parens patriae doctrine to the three prospective
intervenors threaten to put the Court in the business of allocating
water within states as well as between states. As a result, the Supreme
Court compromised state sovereign ownership and public trust values
113. Id. at 373.
114. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614–15 (1983) (allowing five Native
American tribes to intervene); New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 370–71 (recognizing Pennsylvania’s, but
not Philadelphia’s, right to intervene).
115. The special master formulated a new rule to govern intervention in original actions that
would seem to greatly expand direct access to the Supreme Court on behalf of private parties.
See infra notes 164–170 and accompanying text.
116. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 859 (2010).
117. Id.

STARR IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTERVENTION IN WATER DISPUTES

3/17/2013 3:55 PM

1445

and undermined the power of state legislatures to allocate water
resources through the political process.
B. Applying the New Jersey Test and the Parens Patriae Doctrine
The New Jersey test, which the Court reaffirmed in South
Carolina, requires that the nonstate intervenor “show a compelling
interest ‘in his own right,’ distinct from the collective interest of ‘all
other citizens and creatures of the state,’ whose interest the State
118
presumptively represents in matters of sovereign policy.” Thus, the
New Jersey test has two prongs: the interest must be distinct from the
interest of other state citizens as a class and not presumptively
represented by a party-state.
1. The City of Charlotte. The Court held that Charlotte could not
intervene, likely because the New Jersey test had specifically denied
Philadelphia’s intervention when Pennsylvania was already a party to
119
the suit. Both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts agreed that
Charlotte’s interest was no different from that of any other
municipality, individual, or corporation within North Carolina that
120
would want to put its straw in the river. Under the doctrine of
parens patriae, the state is presumed to represent the interest of its
citizens in matters implicating state sovereignty. This principle holds
true even when the state’s and the citizen’s interests are inconsistent
121
or even in opposition to each other. Thus, regardless of whether
North Carolina would actually represent Charlotte’s interests well or
at all, North Carolina is presumed to represent Charlotte’s interests,
because the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is not the proper
forum for a state to be “judicially impeached on matters of policy by
122
its own subjects.” The limitation of the Court’s original jurisdiction
to disputes in which there is no other appropriate forum influenced
the Court in denying Charlotte’s intervention, because Charlotte had
the option of pursuing its grievances in state court.

118. Id. at 867 (quoting New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373).
119. See supra notes 108–111.
120. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 867; id. at 873 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
121. See Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 162, 173 (1930) (“A State suing, or sued, in this
Court, by virtue of the original jurisdiction over controversies between States, must be deemed
to represent all its citizens.”).
122. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373.
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2. Duke Energy and the Catawba River Water Supply Project.
Although both Duke Energy and the CRWSP could also be expected
to pursue grievances in state court, the Supreme Court found that
they satisfied both prongs of the New Jersey test. But Justice Alito’s
analysis deviated from his own expression of the New Jersey test as
applied to Charlotte. Both parties had a stake in the dispute because
they both depend on the Catawba’s waters and would be affected, at
least indirectly, by the outcome. Duke Energy operates eleven
hydroelectric dams along the Catawba River “that generate electricity
for the region and control the flow of the river,” and its interest in the
123
litigation could thus have been described as compelling. The
CRWSP, representing the water-consuming citizens of two counties,
124
could have been characterized similarly. But neither Duke Energy
nor the CRWSP should have been deemed to satisfy either prong of
the New Jersey test.
a. A Compelling Interest Distinct from the Interests of Other State
Citizens as a Class. Rather than focusing on the type of interest at
stake—as the first prong of the New Jersey test requires—the Court
instead emphasized Duke Energy’s “powerful interests that likely will
shape the outcome of this litigation,” finding “no other similarly
125
situated entity on the Catawba River.” In contrast, Chief Justice
Roberts, in dissent, found Duke Energy’s interests to be no different
from those of any other user of the Catawba River’s water in the
Carolinas: “The State’s ‘citizens and creatures’ certainly put the
Catawba’s water and flow to different uses—many for drinking water,
some for farming or recreation, others for generating power. That
126
does not, however, make their interest in the water itself unique.”
Thus, although Duke Energy likely uses more water on the Catawba
than any other individual user, its interest is still part of a class of
other water users.
It follows that if the Court were to apportion water directly to
Duke Energy, it would effectively be apportioning water within states
rather than between states. Chief Justice Roberts noted that “[o]ther
citizens of North Carolina doubtless have reasons of their own, ones
they find as important as Duke Energy believes its to be,” and

123.
124.
125.
126.

South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 866.
Id. at 864–65.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 873 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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“[w]eighing those interests is an ‘intramural’ matter for the State.”
Even though Duke Energy’s hydropower operations are substantial,
it still should not be able to defend its interest as a coequal litigant
with North Carolina and South Carolina, who each represent the
interests of countless state water users, including Duke Energy.
Following a similar line of reasoning as it applied to Duke
Energy, the Court found that the CRWSP’s interest was distinct from
those of other citizens of the Carolinas because of the volume of its
withdrawals, the value of its water infrastructure investments, and its
128
status as a bistate entity. These arguments do not withstand
scrutiny, nor do they reflect a cogent application of the New Jersey
test. Many other counties in both North and South Carolina depend
on the Catawba River and have spent money on water infrastructure;
the CRWSP’s interests cannot be distinct simply because the entity
129
involves counties from both states.
The Court also found Duke Energy’s interest distinct because of
its existing license with FERC and its ongoing efforts to renew the
130
license. But the Court’s reasoning focused on the useful information
Duke Energy would provide rather than on the extent to which Duke
Energy’s relationship with the federal government made it distinct
131
from other citizen water users in the Carolinas. In fact, the United
States filed an amicus brief that refuted Duke Energy’s assertion that
the pending renewal of its FERC license merited the power
132
company’s intervention. The mere fact that Duke Energy possesses
information relevant (or even indispensable) to the dispute does not
merit its party status, because possessing information does not set
127. Id. at 874.
128. Id. at 864 (majority opinion).
129. See infra notes 145–150 and accompanying text.
130. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 866–67.
131. See id. at 866–67 (“[Duke Energy’s Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement], likewise,
represents the full consensus of 70 parties from both States regarding the appropriate minimum
continuous flow of Catawba River water into South Carolina under a variety of natural
conditions and, in times of drought, the conservation measures to be taken by entities that
withdraw water from the Catawba River. These factors undeniably are relevant to any ‘just and
equitable apportionment’ of the Catawba River and we are likely to consider them in reaching
our ultimate disposition of this case.” (citation omitted) (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176, 183 (1982))).
132. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s Exceptions at 20
n.3, South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (No. 138) (“[S]o long as the terms of the [relicensing
agreement] are taken into account in the equitable apportionment, the mere fact that Duke
impounds and releases the waters being apportioned does not give Duke a sufficiently concrete
interest in the outcome of the apportionment.”).
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Duke Energy apart from other citizens as a class. Many other citizens
of the Carolinas may also have relevant information, but information
alone is quite different from having a “distinct interest.”
The Court analogized permitting Duke Energy and the
133
CRWSP’s intervention to its decision in Maryland v. Louisiana, a
case in which seventeen private gas pipeline companies were
134
permitted to intervene in an original action. But beyond the surface
similarities, Maryland is easily distinguishable from South Carolina.
In fact, Maryland provides an excellent example of the kind of
interest that is compelling and “distinct from the collective interest of
135
‘all other citizens and creatures of the state’” under the New Jersey
test. In Maryland, several states challenged the constitutionality of
136
Louisiana’s tax on natural gas imported into the state. The Court
reasoned, “[g]iven that the Tax is directly imposed on the owner of
the imported gas and that the pipeline companies most often own the
137
gas, those companies have a direct stake in this controversy.”
Dissenting in South Carolina, Chief Justice Roberts distinguished
Duke Energy and the CRWSP’s interests from those of the pipeline
companies, explaining that “an interest in a tax imposed only on
discrete parties is obviously different from a general interest shared
138
by all citizens of the State.” In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts
further suggested that a private party “with a federal statutory right to
a certain quantity of water might have a compelling interest in an
equitable-apportionment action that is not fairly represented by the
139
States.” The distinguishing fact in the Chief Justice’s hypothetical is
that the private intervenor would be asserting a right to use water
based in federal law rather than state law, and thus a state would not
be presumed to represent that federal water interest. But when a
water user’s rights are wholly dependent on state law, it should be
difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy the New Jersey test.
133. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
134. Id. at 745 n.21; see also South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862 (“More recently, the Court
has . . . permitted corporations to intervene in an original action challenging a State’s imposition
of a tax that burdened interstate commerce and contravened the Supremacy Clause . . . .” (citing
Maryland, 451 U.S. at 745 n.21)).
135. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 867 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373
(1953) (per curiam)).
136. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 728.
137. Id. at 745 n.21.
138. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 873 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
139. Id. at 872 n.1.
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b. An Interest Not Presumptively Represented by a Party-State.
Although Justice Alito correctly stated the second factor in terms of
whether the proposed intervenor is presumptively represented by a
party-state, when applying the factor to Duke Energy and the
CRWSP he instead considered whether the private intervenors are
actually represented by the party-states. The Court noted that neither
North Carolina nor South Carolina had “signed [Duke Energy’s
FERC relicensing agreement] or expressed an intention to defend its
140
terms.” Justice Alito’s observation suggests that Duke Energy may
not like how the party-states would actually represent its interests, but
that observation should not have been decisive. That is, North
Carolina and South Carolina must be presumed to represent all water
users within their borders. The people of the Carolinas may rely on
Duke Energy’s hydroelectric power, but state governments, not the
Supreme Court, should bear the responsibility of balancing power
generation with competing uses of water.
Similarly, with respect to the CRWSP, Justice Alito noted that
South Carolina’s complaint included the CRWSP’s transfers to North
Carolina as a portion of the total harm it attributed to North
Carolina, and that North Carolina had asserted it could not represent
141
the CRWSP as a joint venture. Justice Alito also considered that
“[t]he stresses that this litigation would place upon the CRWSP
threaten to upset the fine balance on which the joint venture is
premised, and neither State has sufficient interest in maintaining that
142
balance to represent the full scope of the CRWSP’s interests.”
Again, Justice Alito provided evidence supporting whether North
Carolina or South Carolina could adequately represent a party, rather
than whether either state is presumed to represent the CRWSP under
the parens patriae doctrine. Here, South Carolina is presumed to
represent Lancaster County and North Carolina is presumed to
represent Union County. Although it seems unlikely that either state
would sacrifice the interests of these particular counties in favor of
other water users, it is fully within their right to do so. Because the
143
“CRWSP’s position is really no different from Charlotte’s,” if either

140. Id. at 867 (majority opinion).
141. Id. at 865.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 874 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see
also First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 5, at 25.
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county objects to its treatment, it may pursue its grievances in state
court.
Because water is a sovereign interest, the states are properly
deemed to represent the water rights of citizens such as Duke Energy
and the CRWSP. Chief Justice Roberts observed that a private
party’s interest is “‘not properly represented’ by a State when it is not
144
a sovereign interest but instead a parochial one.” Here, Chief
Justice Roberts highlighted how Justice Alito redefined “properly
represented” to mean well represented rather than presumptively
represented. Therefore, by broadening the definition of proper
representation under the New Jersey test, the Court effectively
relaxed the citizen intervention standard for equitable
apportionments.
Although the Court was persuaded that Duke Energy and the
CRWSP, as multistate entities, could not be presumptively
represented by either state, this argument does not hold up to
scrutiny. The Court’s precedents suggest that the parens patriae
doctrine applies equally to corporate entities, multistate entities, and
145
corporate multistate entities. Duke Energy is headquartered in
146
Charlotte and has substantial operations in both states. Similarly,
the CRWSP represents the interests of a South Carolina county and a
147
North Carolina county. It follows that these entities would be
represented by both state governments rather than neither. Thus,
North Carolina can be presumed to represent Duke Energy’s
interests as its place of incorporation and South Carolina can be
presumed to represent Duke Energy’s operations within its borders.
Chief Justice Roberts cautioned that “[a] bistate entity cannot be
allowed to intervene merely because it embodies an ‘intermingling of

144. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 874 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953)
(per curiam)).
145. See, e.g., New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373 (“The case before us demonstrates the wisdom of
the [parens patriae principle]. The City of Philadelphia represents only a part of the citizens of
Pennsylvania who reside in the watershed area of the Delaware River . . . . Furthermore, we are
told by New Jersey that there are cities along the Delaware River in that State which, like
Philadelphia, are responsible for their own water systems . . . . Nor is there any assurance that
the list of intervenors could be closed with political subdivisions of the states. Large industrial
plants which, like cities, are corporate creatures of the state may represent interests just as
substantial.”).
146. About Us, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/default.asp (last
visited Mar. 4, 2013).
147. See supra note 10.
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state interests,’” because “[t]he same would be true of any bistate
entity, or indeed any corporation or individual conducting business in
148
both States.” Thus, the Court may have opened its doors to any
corporation doing business in both North Carolina and South
Carolina that also happens to rely on water from the Catawba River.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[b]istate entities are
not States entitled to invoke our original jurisdiction, and should not
be effectively accorded an automatic right to intervene as parties in
149
cases within that jurisdiction.” Such an interpretation is consistent
with the Court’s long-held understanding of its original jurisdiction as
a forum of last resort for interstate disputes concerning issues of state
150
sovereignty. Thus, bistate status alone should not be sufficient
grounds to satisfy the New Jersey test.
Although both Duke Energy and the CRWSP may have had
compelling reasons to seek intervention, Justice Alito’s determination
that their interests were distinct from and could not be presumptively
represented by the party-states is unconvincing under the New Jersey
test. In New Jersey, the Court was specifically concerned about
granting Philadelphia’s intervention because “[l]arge industrial plants
which, like cities, are corporate creatures of the state may represent
151
interests just as substantial.” The New Jersey Court warned that
“original jurisdiction should not be thus expanded to the dimension of
152
ordinary class actions.” By allowing Duke Energy and the CRWSP
to intervene in South Carolina, the Supreme Court crippled the New
Jersey test, effectively relaxing the standard for citizens seeking to
intervene in future equitable apportionments and, perhaps, other
original actions before the Court.
C. Finding an Appropriate Standard for Citizen Intervention in
Equitable Apportionments
Equitable apportionments are unique among original actions.
But the New Jersey test, which was developed in the context of an
equitable-apportionment action, has been the standard for

148. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 874 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 865 n.6 (majority opinion)).
149. Id.
150. See supra Part III.A.
151. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) (per curiam).
152. Id.
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intervention in other original actions between states. In South
Carolina, both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged
that an equitable apportionment might impose a higher burden for
private intervention, but they disagreed as to how much higher this
154
burden should be. Citizen intervention in equitable-apportionment
actions challenges both the boundaries of the Court’s original
jurisdiction and a state’s sovereign right to allocate water resources
within its borders. Building on Chief Justice Roberts’s defense of
state sovereignty, this Note argues that because of the law governing
water resources in the United States, and the challenges presented by
the energy-water nexus, the test for private-party intervention in an
original action should, as a normative matter, bar most attempts at
citizen intervention in equitable apportionments.
First, the Supreme Court has freely admitted that it is ill suited to
serve as a trial court in equitable-apportionment and other original
155
actions. The Court’s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction is
156
thus born out of “a necessary recognition of sovereign dignity,” in
keeping with the Court’s understanding of original jurisdiction as a
forum of last resort. In South Carolina, Chief Justice Roberts warned
that “[t]he Court’s decision to permit nonsovereigns to intervene in
this case has the potential to alter in a fundamental way the nature of
our original jurisdiction, transforming it from a means of resolving
high disputes between sovereigns into a forum for airing private
157
interests.” And the New Jersey Court voiced this same concern

153. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972) (applying the New Jersey test
when Illinois sought relief against several municipal entities in Wisconsin for allegedly polluting
Lake Michigan).
154. Compare South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862 (majority opinion) (“[A] compelling reason
for allowing citizens to participate in one original action is not necessarily a compelling reason
for allowing citizens to intervene in all original actions.”), with id. at 871 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have strongly intimated in
other decisions (albeit in dictum) that private entities can rarely, if ever, intervene in original
actions involving the apportionment of interstate waterways.”).
155. See id. at 863 (majority opinion) (“[Original] actions tax the limited resources of this
Court by requiring us ‘awkwardly to play the role of factfinder’ and diverting our attention from
our primary responsibility as an appellate tribunal.” (quoting Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp.,
401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971))).
156. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373; see also United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892)
(“Such exclusive jurisdiction was given to this court, because it best comported with the dignity
of a State, that a case in which it was a party should be determined in the highest, rather than in
a subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation.”).
157. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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when it described its test as “a working rule for good judicial
administration,” to prevent a scenario in which “a state might be
judicially impeached on matters of policy by its own subjects, and
there would be no practical limitation on the number of citizens, as
158
such, who would be entitled to be made parties.” Although the
Chief Justice may have overstated the risk in suggesting that original
159
actions may become “town-meeting lawsuits,” given the Court’s
limited resources and the likely increase in water conflicts due to the
energy-water nexus and global climate change, even a small rise in
successful citizen intervenors may hinder the Court’s ability to resolve
interstate water disputes.
The United States’ amicus brief advocated a similar position,
arguing that relaxing the standard for intervention “could potentially
involve the Court in the resolution of intramural water disputes on
160
the scale of state-wide general stream adjudication.” The amicus
brief further expressed concern that “even assuming that these
actions could be litigated manageably with a significantly expanded
number of parties, the expansion would make it significantly less
161
likely that these cases could be settled.” Although in this particular
case, Duke Energy played a central role in bringing the parties to a
162
settlement, it does not necessarily follow that settlement occurred
because the Court permitted it to intervene. Duke Energy could have
played a similar role by filing an amicus brief and participating in
163
interstate negotiations.
Second, the mistaken presumption that a party with necessary
information is indispensable to an equitable apportionment is
reflected in the special master’s rule, which the Court in South
Carolina rejected as overly broad. The special master’s proposed

158. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373.
159. South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 870 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 376 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
160. Brief for United States in Support of Plaintiff’s Exceptions, supra note 132, at 21.
161. Id.
162. See Lyle Denniston, The Key to Settling a Big Fight, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 17, 2010, 7:40
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/12/the-key-to-settling-a-big-fight (“[W]hen negotiations
that followed the ruling came to an end this Fall, the two states rallied around Duke Energy’s
interests, and made a deal that might last for the next four or five decades, supposedly a model
for regional cooperation.”).
163. See South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 875 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (“Where he presents no new questions, a third party can contribute
usually most effectively and always most expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by
intervention.” (quoting Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam))).
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standard would have permitted intervention in a far wider range of
circumstances than would the New Jersey test. It would encompass a
party that is “the instrumentality authorized to carry out the wrongful
conduct or injury for which the complaining state seeks relief,” or a
164
party that “has a ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of the action.” The
fact that a party “would advance the ‘full exposition’ of the issues”
165
Additionally, the special
would further support intervention.
master’s rule failed to account properly for the parens patriae
doctrine, which is implicated by both factors of the New Jersey test.
Under the special master’s standard, Charlotte’s and the CRWSP’s
motions to intervene were granted because the parties were
“authorized to carry out” the interbasin transfers of which South
166
Carolina complained. In contrast, Duke Energy’s motion was
granted because of its “direct stake in the outcome” and ability to
167
advance “a full exposition of the issues.”
The Court explicitly declined to adopt the special master’s
proposed standard but implicitly incorporated elements of that
standard into its application of the New Jersey test. Justice Alito
dismissed the special master’s standard because “a compelling reason
for allowing citizens to participate in one original action is not
necessarily a compelling reason for allowing citizens to intervene in
168
all original actions.” Although Justice Alito noted that the special
master’s rule accounted for “the full compass of our precedents,”
referring to original actions broadly, he preferred the more limited
New Jersey test developed in the context of an equitable
169
apportionment. But the special master’s rule seems to explain the
outcome better than does Justice Alito’s application of the New
Jersey test, which was discussed in Part III.B. The majority opinion
emphasized both Duke Energy’s impact on the Catawba River’s flow
through the operation of its hydropower facilities and its ability to
170
provide essential information. Both of these concerns are quite
relevant to the special master’s standard, but they have little bearing
on the New Jersey test. The Court’s rejection of the special master’s
proposed rule would seem to support a conclusion that equitable
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 5, at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 28–32.
South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862.
Id.
Id. at 866.
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apportionments are distinct from other classes of original actions. But
instead, throughout the majority opinion, Justice Alito framed the
issue as whether the parties should be permitted to intervene in an
original action, echoing the special master’s standard, which was
171
derived from a range of original jurisdiction precedents. In contrast,
Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue in terms of intervention in an
172
equitable apportionment specifically.
Third, boundary disputes, another frequent player on the Court’s
original jurisdiction docket, provide an instructive comparison to
equitable apportionments, highlighting that equitable-apportionment
actions are different because of the communal nature of water rights
in the United States. In a boundary dispute, a party-state may rely
substantially on a private party’s ownership interest in asserting its
173
sovereign interest. For example, in Texas v. Louisiana, the Court
permitted Port Arthur to intervene because it claimed title to islands
in the Sabine River that were the subject of a dispute between the
174
federal government and Texas. Unlike a boundary dispute, in which
a private party seeks to intervene to defend its title, private parties in
equitable apportionments do not have equivalent property interests
to justify intervention. A usufructuary interest in water is distinct
from private title to land, in which ownership entails considerably
more than a limited right to use a natural resource for certain
purposes. This distinction is supported by both the inherent qualities
of water resources and the structure of water law in the United
175
States. All original actions before the Supreme Court are sovereign
disputes, but some disputes may more significantly implicate
sovereign concerns and public values than others. In water-rights
disputes, the absence of a legally cognizable private ownership right
171. See id. at 862 (“This Court likewise has granted leave, under appropriate circumstances,
for non-state entities to intervene as parties in original actions between states for nearly 90
years.”).
172. See id. at 870 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(“Applying [the compelling-interest test], this Court has never granted a nonsovereign entity’s
motion to intervene in an equitable apportionment action.”).
173. Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976) (per curiam).
174. Id. at 466; see also South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862 (citing Texas, 426 U.S. at 466). But
even a claim to private title does not guarantee intervention. For example, in Utah v. United
States, 394 U.S. 89 (1969) (per curiam), Morton International, Inc. moved to intervene in a
dispute over title to portions of the Great Salt Lake, id. at 95. In denying Morton’s intervention,
the Court noted, “If Morton is admitted, fairness would require the admission of any of the
other 120 private landowners who wish to quiet their title to portions of the relicted lands,
greatly increasing the complexity of this litigation.” Id. at 95–96.
175. See supra Part I.A.
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in water typically eliminates the justification for citizen intervention.
Thus, whereas the New Jersey test alone should be sufficient to bar
citizen intervention in equitable apportionments, the nature and
structure of water rights in the United States make such intervention
all but impossible.
Ultimately, because of the usufructuary nature of water rights,
traditional water federalism, and the public trust doctrine, equitable
apportionments are distinct from other original actions. As discussed
above in Part III.B, equitable-apportionment decrees control water
rights at the state level rather than at the individual level. Each
sovereign state is left to allocate its equitable share according to statelaw principles, without federal intervention. A state’s citizens should
not be parties to an equitable apportionment because they are not
176
individually bound by the Court’s decree. The existence of an
appropriate, alternate forum—in this case, state court—for both
Duke Energy and the CRWSP to dispute an intrastate allocation of
water also counsels against giving private entities access to the
Court’s discretionary original jurisdiction. Chief Justice Roberts
would have denied citizen intervention to protect state sovereignty
and the Court’s own docket, but the communal nature of water
resources and environmental concerns further caution against a
relaxed standard for nonstate parties. The public trust doctrine, in
spite of its fifty different forms, remains the most enduring assertion
of the communal nature of water rights in the United States, held by
177
the state governments as representatives of the people.
The looming concerns of the energy-water nexus and global
climate change reinforce the need to protect the role of the states
under the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine shapes what
states can and cannot do with trust resources and also the extent to
which federal courts should defer to states when the management of
trust resources is at stake, absent congressional intent to the contrary.
Private parties will rarely have interests in water that are not
dependent on the interest of the states as representatives of their
citizens. Therefore, the uniquely public values implicated by equitable
apportionments and the communal nature of water resources support
that it should be difficult for private parties to defend their interests
in water as coequal litigants with sovereign states.

176. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part I.A.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF INTERSTATE WATER DISPUTES: COURTS AND
LEGISLATURES
Although the Supreme Court has proved reasonably adept at
balancing states’ claims in equitable-apportionment actions,
evaluating tradeoffs between competing types of water uses has not
played a central role in equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. As
the California Supreme Court characterized, “The scope and
technical complexity of issues concerning water-resource
management are unequalled by virtually any other type of activity
178
presented to the courts.” The U.S. Supreme Court should recognize
that adjudicating interstate water rights pushes the boundaries of its
179
institutional competence,
beyond the inherent concerns of
simultaneously playing the roles of trial and appellate court. The
energy-water nexus dictates that states must make key tradeoffs
between the need to use water resources in energy production versus
other consumptive uses, as evidenced by the energy-water challenges
facing Charlotte and other metropolitan areas across the United
180
States. Although evaluating competing policy proposals for national
water policy is beyond the scope of this Note, these kinds of tradeoffs
in the allocation of scarce natural resources, which are “highly
charged political issues,” are best handled through the political
process, at either the state or federal level, rather than through the
181
courts.
Several scholars have challenged the efficacy of equitable
apportionment as compared to interstate compacts or congressional
intervention because of federalism concerns and the Court’s inability
to handle the highly technical information required to develop good

178. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1980) (quoting Envtl.
Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128, 1137 (Cal. 1977)).
179. Cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern Water
Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485, 522 (1986) (“[M]any courts today do not realize that, in altering
common law water doctrines, they are altering the rules by which allocations are
made . . . . [C]ourts today typically understate their allocative role and therefore fail to fulfill it
competently.”).
180. See Sovacool, supra note 4, at 25–33 (describing the challenges faced by electric utilities
and water planners in eight metropolitan areas).
181. See, e.g., Henry Melvin Hart, Jr., Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 40, 45 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) (“[The
legislature] is most significantly an instrument of negotiation and compromise of highly charged
political issues which cannot be brought to acceptable settlement through the everyday
processes of administration and adjudication. For the performance of this function it is superbly
and uniquely equipped.”).
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water policy. Professor Dan Tarlock suggests that such criticisms are
widespread because “[j]udicial deference to the quasi-sovereign states
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to do other than to
articulate vague standards of interstate equality rather than firm
182
principles such as economic maximization.” But Professor Tarlock
argues that “the Supreme Court has often shown itself capable of
striking sensible accommodation among competing demands,”
183
particularly in the interpretation of existing compacts. Others have
not been quite so generous. For example, Professor Carl Erhardt
argues that “the Court is inherently incapable of fully understanding
the technicalities that are necessary in providing for an equitable
solution,” leading to “a lack of truly informed decision-making” and
184
“unpredictable results.”
In response to the perceived problems of equitable
apportionment, some scholars have advocated a stronger role for
185
Congress in resolving interstate water-rights disputes.
But
considering both the historical infrequency of congressional
apportionments and the politically charged nature of these disputes, it
seems unlikely that Congress will assume a more significant role in
interstate water-rights disputes. Thus, Supreme Court equitable
186
apportionments will continue to wield significant influence. In
addition, regardless of how many interstate water-rights disputes
actually come before the Supreme Court, its equitable-apportionment
jurisprudence casts a long shadow over settlement and compact
negotiations. Thus, if the Court’s holding in South Carolina leads to
an increased role for the Court in guiding intrastate water allocation
policy, the repercussions will be felt broadly, as global climate change
will likely lead to regional increases in drought conditions and more
interstate water-rights conflicts.
The Catawba-Wateree Basin illustrates the complex
interdependence of energy and water policy, and this
182. Tarlock, supra note 78, at 382.
183. Id. at 411.
184. Carl Erhardt, The Battle Over “The Hooch”: The Federal-Interstate Water Compact and
the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200, 213–14 (1992).
185. See generally Sherk, supra note 79; E. Leif Reid, Note, Ripples from the Truckee: The
Case for Congressional Apportionment of Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 145 (1995).
186. See, e.g., Dyckman, supra note 80, at 229 (“But the court system is increasingly
becoming the locus of these decisions in the absence of cooperation. And in making allocations
that change uses, associated property rights, and growth itself, the U.S. Supreme Court impacts
the rest of the country’s water management.”).
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interdependence cautions that the Court not overreach in its
equitable-apportionment cases by engaging with substantive waterallocation policy, however indirectly. As discussed in Part I, Charlotte
was named the country’s metropolitan area most at risk for water
187
shortages due to power-plant withdrawals. These water shortages
are anticipated largely because of plans by Duke Energy to build new
188
thermoelectric plants in the Catawba-Wateree Basin. Duke Energy
is already the largest single water user in the Catawba-Wateree
189
Basin, and its entire energy portfolio in the Carolinas (comprised of
hydroelectric, coal-fired, nuclear, oil, and natural-gas energy
190
resources) is water intensive. Duke Energy has already faced
electricity supply problems from its plants on the Catawba River
191
during drought conditions. As is unsurprising for one of America’s
192
most endangered rivers, the Catawba faces a wide range of waterquality issues, all of which are exacerbated by low water levels,
including too many nutrients, too little dissolved oxygen, and fecal
193
coliform and mercury contamination. Thus, the Catawba River
presents economic and environmental management challenges that
necessitate tradeoffs by policymakers who are fully engaged with the
concerns of municipalities, scientists, industry, and citizens. And the
Catawba-Wateree Basin is only one of many similarly situated areas
in the country facing policy tradeoffs in allocating scarce water
resources, compounding the importance of these challenges.
Many were pleased with the results of the negotiated settlement
between the states, Duke Energy, and the CRWSP, including the

187. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
188. See Sovacool, supra note 4, at 26–27 (“[T]he associated water use with [Duke Energy’s
planned thermoelectric plants] could exacerbate drought (at best) and risk interstate litigation
and agricultural collapse (at worst).”).
189. See Water Quality Facts, CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER, http://www.catawbariverkeeper
.org/News/waterqualityfacts (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (“Evaporative losses from cooling [Duke
Energy’s] nuclear and coal-fired power plants makes up almost 50% of the net water use in the
basin.”).
190. Sovacool, supra note 4, at 26–27; Alert: 2007 Drought Advisories, Drought Advisory #2,
CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.catawbariverkeeper.org/News/News/
alert-2007-drought-advisory.
191. See News Release, Duke Energy, Duke Energy Carolinas Announces Special Power
Purchase and Seeks Cost Recovery (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.duke-energy.com/
news/releases/2008030401.asp (detailing Duke Energy’s efforts to manage drought conditions,
such as reducing hydropower operations, modifying plants, and purchasing power from another
supplier in South Carolina).
192. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
193. Water Quality Facts, supra note 189.
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Catawba Riverkeeper Foundation, a nonprofit environmental group.
The Southern Environmental Law Center, which represented the
Riverkeeper, characterized the agreement as “a model for water
conservation and efficiency measures that, if adopted by other
194
municipalities, could help protect all the state’s rivers.” Even
though the settlement may have led to greater cooperation in the
Carolinas, Professor Caitlin Dyckman is cautious, noting that “the
precipitating circumstances [in South Carolina] were quite fortuitous,
and may not be replicable; using litigation in lieu of negotiation is
195
rarely preferable.” The use of a special master, without the benefit
of a full trial process to ensure adequate factfinding, raises particular
concerns about making policy through the Supreme Court’s original
196
jurisdiction. It remains to be seen whether South Carolina will lead
to a dramatic influx of private intervenors along the lines of the
197
parade of horribles offered by Chief Justice Roberts. But the
potential for nonsovereign intervention will likely further complicate
water-resource management at the state government level.
In this sense, the Court’s South Carolina holding reflects a shortsighted disregard for the complex policy challenges implicated by
giving a private water user—whose “interest in water is an interest
198
shared with other citizens,” —party status in an equitable
apportionment. Further, South Carolina put the Court in the driver’s
seat and will allow the Court again to put its thumb on the scale in
favoring some citizen water users over others, simply because they
use more water—Duke Energy—or because the Court finds a
particular citizen claim more compelling than another—the CRWSP
as compared to Charlotte. As with Duke Energy’s intervention, such
a policy favors the settled expectations of existing users and ties

194. Catawba River Interbasin Transfer Controversy Resolved, CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER,
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.catawbariverkeeper.org/News/con-kan-ibt-dispute-finds-resolution
(quoting Julie Youngman, an attorney for the Southern Environmental Law Center).
195. Dyckman, supra note 80, at 229.
196. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
197. Chief Justice Roberts warned that nonsovereign intervention would “inevitably
prolong the resolution of this and other equitable apportionment actions, which already take
considerable time. Intervenors do not come alone—they bring along more issues to decide,
more discovery requests, more exceptions to the recommendations of the Special Master.”
South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 875 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
198. Id. at 870.
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states’ hands with respect to introducing conservation measures.
Professor Sax hoped that courts would step in when captured
legislatures and agencies failed to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities
to state citizens, in part because he believed that courts could more
effectively stand up to the water-rights claims of powerful private
200
interests. But the adaptability of public trust principles makes the
doctrine equally applicable when a federal court encroaches on the
natural-resource obligations of the state governments. Ultimately, the
federal common law of equitable apportionment developed to resolve
sovereign disputes, not to make national water policy when Congress
has not offered guidance on the issue. Although the settled
expectations of existing users matter, environmental and naturalresource management considerations favor maintaining the states’
traditional authority to determine the intrastate allocation of water
rights by evaluating the interests of each individual water user in a
process that is accountable to voters.
CONCLUSION
Despite the thorny task presented by an equitable
apportionment of interstate waters, the Supreme Court was largely
successful throughout the twentieth century in balancing the
competing claims of states and recognizing each state’s sovereign
right to control and allocate the water resources within its borders.
Now, the Court’s deviation from this tradition in South Carolina
threatens its own ability to resolve these disputes and state
legislatures’ ability to confront increasing freshwater scarcity. Both
equitable-apportionment precedents and the state public trust
doctrines should have prevented Duke Energy and the CRWSP’s
intervention in South Carolina. Further, the facts of the dispute and
the policy concerns of the energy-water nexus and global climate
change indicate that a rise in citizen interventions will threaten the
traditional contours of water federalism and create more obstacles to
developing sound water policy. As a nation and a global community,
we will continue to face water shortages and the resulting need to
make tradeoffs between competing uses. Having waded into such a
complex, volatile, and fundamental policy challenge, the Court should
199. Cf. Sax, supra note 60, at 474 (“[W]e have a potential head-on conflict between existing
water users and their existing and future demands, and the existing and future demands of what
may broadly be called in-stream uses.”).
200. Id. at 560.
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step out, dry off, and work to preserve the status of equitable
apportionments as a forum of last resort for disputes between
sovereigns.

